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ABSTRACT
Primality testing is a basic cryptographic task. But developers today
are faced with complex APIs for primality testing, along with docu-
mentation that fails to clearly state the reliability of the tests being
performed. This leads to the APIs being incorrectly used in practice,
with potentially disastrous consequences. In an effort to overcome
this, we present a primality test having a simplest-possible API: the
test accepts a number to be tested and returns a Boolean indicat-
ing whether the input was composite or probably prime. For all
inputs, the output is guaranteed to be correct with probability at
least 1 − 2−128. The test is performant: on random, odd, 1024-bit
inputs, it is faster than the default test used in OpenSSL by 17%.
We investigate the impact of our new test on the cost of random
prime generation, a key use case for primality testing. The OpenSSL
developers have adopted our suggestions in full; our new API and
primality test are scheduled for release in OpenSSL 3.0.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Primality testing, and closely related tasks like random prime gen-
eration and testing of Diffie-Hellman parameters, are core cryp-
tographic tasks. Primality testing is by now very well understood
mathematically; there is a clear distinction between accuracy and
running time of different tests in settings that are malicious (i.e.
where the input may be adversarially-selected) and non-malicious
(e.g. where the input is random, as is common in prime generation).
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Yet recent research by Albrecht et al. [3] on how primality test-
ing is actually done in practice has highlighted the failure of popu-
lar cryptographic libraries to provide primality testing APIs that
are “misuse-resistant”, that is, which provide reliable results in all
use cases even when the developer is crypto-naive. Extending [3],
Galbraith et. al. [18] showed how failure to perform robust pri-
mality testing in the popular OpenSSL library has serious security
consequences in the face of maliciously generated Diffie-Hellman
parameter sets (see also Bleichenbacher [9] for an earlier example
involving the GNU Crypto library).
The main underlying issue identified in [3] is that, while all li-
braries examined performed well on random inputs, some failed
miserably on maliciously crafted ones in their default settings.
Meanwhile code documentation was generally poor and did not
distinguish clearly between the different use cases. And developers
were faced with complex APIs requiring them to understand the
distinctions between use cases and choose parameters to the APIs
accordingly. An illustrative example is provided by the OpenSSL
primality testing code that existed prior to our work. This required
the developer using the function BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex1 to
pass multiple parameters, including checks, the number of rounds
of Miller-Rabin testing to be carried out; and do_trial_division,
a flag indicating whether or not trial division should be performed.
Setting checks to 0 makes the test default to using a number of
rounds that depends only on the size of the number being tested;
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then the number of rounds decreases as the size increases, this being
motivated by average-case error estimates for the Miller-Rabin pri-
mality test operating on random numbers [14, 29]. This makes the
default setting performant for random prime generation, but dan-
gerous in potentially hostile settings, e.g. Diffie-Hellman parameter
testing.
As an illustration of how this can go wrong in practice, Galbraith
et. al. [18] pointed out that OpenSSL (pre-1.1.1c May 2019) itself
makes the wrong choice in using the default setting when testing
finite field Diffie-Hellman parameters. Galbraith et. al. exploited
this choice to construct Diffie-Hellman parameter sets (p,q,д) of
cryptographic size that fool OpenSSL’s parameter validation with
a non-trivial success rate. OpenSSL’s Diffie-Hellman parameter
validation was subsequently changed to remedy this issue (though
without changing the underlying primality test).
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This example
provides prima facie evidence that even very experienced devel-
opers can misunderstand how to correctly use complex primality
testing APIs.
One may argue that developers who are not cryptography ex-






Strictly, the default is invoked by setting checks to BN_prime_checks, an environ-
mental variable that is set to 0.
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See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8593.
they inevitably will, and, as our OpenSSL example shows, even
expert developers can get it wrong. This motivates the search for
APIs that are “misuse-resistant” or “robust”, and that do not sacri-
fice too much performance. This search accords with a long line
of work that identifies the problem of API design as being critical
for making it possible for developers to write secure cryptographic
software (see [20, 22, 43] amongst others).
1.1 Our Contributions
Given this background, we set out to design a performant primality
test that provides strong security guarantees across all use cases
and that has the simplest possible API: it takes just one input, the
number being tested for primality, and returns just one integer (or
Boolean) indicating that the tested number is highly likely to be
prime (1) or is definitely composite (0). We note that none of the
many crypto libraries examined in [3] provide such an API.
We examine different options for the core of our test – whether
to use many rounds of Miller-Rabin (MR) testing (up to 64 or 128,





to rely on a more complex primality test, such as the Baillie-PSW
test [37] which combines MR testing with a Lucas test. Based on
a combination of code simplicity, performance and guaranteed
security, we opt for 64 rounds of MR as the core of our test.
We also study the performance impact of doing trial division
prior to more expensive testing. This is common practice in pri-
mality testing code, with the idea being that one can trade fast but
inaccurate trial division for much slower but more accurate number
theoretic tests such as Miller-Rabin. For example, OpenSSL tests
for divisibility using a fixed list of the first 2047 odd primes. We
show that this is a sub-optimal choice when testing random inputs
of common cryptographic sizes, and that the running time can be
reduced substantially by doing trial division with fewer primes. The
optimal amount of trial division to use depends on the size of the
input being tested, though is not a new observation – see for exam-
ple [23, 28, 29]. What is more surprising is that OpenSSL chooses
so conservatively and with a fixed list of primes (independent of
the input size). For example, with 1024-bit random, odd inputs, trial
division using the first 128 odd primes already removes about 83%
of candidates, while extending the list to 2047 primes, as OpenSSL
does, only removes a further 5.5%. On average, it turns out to be
faster to incur the cost of an MR test on that additional 5.5% than it
is to do the full set of trial divisions.
The outcome of our analysis is a primality test whose perfor-
mance on random, odd, 1024-bit inputs is on average 17% faster
than the current OpenSSL test, but which guarantees that com-
posites are identified with overwhelming probability (1 − 2−128),
no matter the input distribution. The downside is that, for inputs
that are actually prime rather than random, our test is significantly
slower than with OpenSSL’s default settings (since we do 64 MR
tests compared to the handful of tests used by OpenSSL). This is
the price to be paid for a misuse-resistant API.
We then examine how our choice of primality test affects the
performance of a crucial use case for primality testing, namely
generation of random k-bit primes. OpenSSL already includes code
for this. It makes use of a sieving step to perform trial division
at reduced cost across many candidates, obviating the need to
perform per-candidate trial division internally to the primality test.
OpenSSL avoids the internal trial division via the above-mentioned
do_trial_division input to the primality test in OpenSSL. Since
we do not allow such an input in our simplified primality testing
API, a developer using our API would be (implicitly) forced to do
trial division on a per candidate basis, potentially increasing the
cost of prime generation. Moreover, our primality test may use
many more rounds of MR testing than OpenSSL selects in this case,
since our API does not permit the user to vary the number of rounds
according to the use case. However, for random prime generation,
most candidates are rejected after just one MR test, and so the full
cost of our test (trial division plus 64 rounds of MR testing) is only
incurred once, when a prime is actually encountered. So we seek
to understand the performance impact of plugging our new API
and primality test into the existing OpenSSL prime generation code.
We find that, for generation of random 1024-bit primes OpenSSL’s
prime generation code is 35-45% slower when using our primality
test internally. For this cost, we gain an API for primality testing
that is as simple as possible and where the test has strong security
guarantees across all use cases.
We communicated our findings to the OpenSSL developers,
and they have adopted our suggestions with only minor modi-
fications: the forthcoming OpenSSL 3.0 (scheduled for release in
Q4 of 2020) will include our simplified API for primality testing,
and the OpenSSL codebase has been updated to use it almost every-
where (the exception is prime generation, which uses the old API
in order to avoid redundant trial division). Moreover, OpenSSL will
now always use our suggested primality test (64 rounds of MR) on
all inputs up to 2048 bits, and 128 rounds of MR on larger inputs.
This represents the first major reform of the primality testing code
in OpenSSL for more than 20 years.
1.2 Related Work
The topic of API design for cryptography has a long history and
connections to related fields such as usable security and API design
for security more generally.
As early as 2002, Gutmann [22] identified the need to carefully
define cryptographic APIs, recommending to “[p]rovide crypto
functionality at the highest level possible in order to prevent users
from injuring themselves and others through misuse of low-level
crypto functions with properties they aren’t aware of.” This is pre-
cisely what we aim to do for primality testing in this paper.
Later, Wurster and van Oorschot [43] (in the broader context of
security) argued that attention should be focussed on those devel-
opers who produce core functionality used by other developers, e.g.
producers of APIs. They identified the need to design APIs which
can be easily used in a secure fashion.
Green and Smith [20] extensively discuss the need for usable
security APIs, and focus on cryptographic ones. They give an ex-
tensive list of requirements for good APIs, including: APIs should
be easy to learn, even without cryptographic expertise; defaults
should be safe and never ambiguous; APIs should be easy to use,
even without documentation; APIs should be hard to misuse and
incorrect use should lead to visible errors. These precepts have
influenced our API design for primality testing.
Acar et al. [2] advocate for a research agenda for usable security
and privacy research that focusses on developers rather than end
users. This encompasses cryptography. Recent research related to
this agenda and having a cryptographic focus includes [1, 15, 16,
19, 25, 33, 34].
Nonce-based Authenticated Encryption (AE), a primitive intro-
duced by Rogaway [39], can be seen as an attempt to simplify the
symmetric encryption API for developers, replacing the need to
understand various requirements on IVs with the arguably simpler
need to be able to supply unique (per key) inputs to an encryption
algorithm. It has become the standard target for algorithm design-
ers. However, as [10] showed, developers can accidentally misuse
even this simplified API, with disastrous results for nonce-sensitive
modes like AES-GCM. This motivated the development of misuse-
resistant AE schemes, which attempt to preserve as much security
as possible even when nonces are repeated. Prominent examples
include SIV [40], Deoxys-II (part of the CAESAR competition fi-
nal portfolio), and AES-GCM-SIV [21] (see also RFC 8452). Later
authors identified the fact that developers may want an even higher-
level API, for example a secure streaming channel like that provided
by TLS [17, 35] or channels that tolerate some forms of reordering
and repetition [11]; the mismatch between what developers want
and what nonce-based AE can provide can lead to attacks, cf. [8].
Bernstein’s design for DH key exchange on Curve25519 [6] de-
liberately presents a simple API for developers: public and private
keys are represented by 32-byte strings, and the need for public
key validation is avoided.
The NaCl crypto library [7] has provision of a simple API to de-
velopers as one of its primary aims. It gives the user a crypto_box
function that encrypts and authenticates messages, with a simple
API of the form: c = crypto_box(m,n,pk,sk), where m is a mes-
sage, n is a nonce, pk is the public key of the recipient and sk is
the private key of the sender. Its security does rely on developers
correctly handling nonces; we are unaware of reports of any misuse
of this type. Some criticism of NaCl’s approach, especially the way
in which it breaks the developer’s expected paradigm, can be found
in [20].
There is an extensive literature on primality testing and genera-
tion, nicely summarised in [29, Chapter 4]. The state-of-the-art has
not changed significantly since the publication of that book in 1996.
On the other hand, as Albrecht et al. [3] showed, primality testing
and generation as it is done in practice has many shortcomings.
Our work can be seen as an effort to narrow the gap between the
literature and its practical application.
1.3 Paper Organisation
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2
we give further background on primality testing and detail the
approach used in OpenSSL. In Section 3 we describe four different
candidate primality tests and analyse them theoretically and ex-
perimentally. Our chosen primality test (64 rounds of Miller-Rabin
with trial division on the first 128 odd primes) emerges from this
analysis as our preferred test. We then evaluate the performance of
this chosen test in the use case of prime generation in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 briefly discusses how our test is being adopted in OpenSSL,




We begin by giving further details on the core primality tests that
we will consider in this work.
2.1.1 Miller-Rabin. The Miller-Rabin (MR) [31, 38] primality test
is a widely-used and efficient algorithm.
A single round of the test proceeds as follows. Suppose n > 1 is
an odd integer to be tested for primality. We first write n = 2ed + 1
where d is odd. If n is prime, we know that there are are no non-
trivial roots of unitymodulon, thus for any integerawith 1 ≤ a < n,
we have:
ad ≡ 1 mod n or a2
id ≡ −1 mod n for some 0 ≤ i < e .
The test then consists of choosing a value a (often referred to as a
base), and then checking the above conditions on n. We declare a
number to be (probably) prime if either of the two conditions hold
and to be composite if both conditions fail. If n is composite and at
least one condition holds, then we say n is a pseudoprime to base a,
or that a is a non-witness to the compositeness of n (since n may be
composite, but a does not demonstrate this fact). It is evident that
computational cost of the test is that of a full-size exponentiation
modulo n.
In practice, the test is iterated t times, using a different, random
choice of base a in each round (though as observed in [3], fixed
bases are often used in crypto libraries, which makes it possible to
construct composites that are always declared prime by the test).
The test is probabilistic, in that a t-round MR test using uniformly
random bases declares any composite number to be composite with
probability at least 1 − 4−t . Moreover, this bound is tight: there are
composites which are not identified as being such over t rounds of
testing with probability 4
−t
. Such numbers, then, are worst-case
adversarial inputs for the test. They are treated extensively in [3].
On the other hand, the test never declares a prime to be composite.
The above discussion holds for any input n, no matter how it
is chosen. When n is a uniformly random odd k-bit integer, much
better performance can be assured. For example, a result of [14]
assures that the probability pk,1 that a composite n chosen in this




. Thus, for k = 1024, we have pk,1 ≤ 2
−40
. Using more
precise bounds from [14], this can be improved to pk,1 ≤ 2
−42.35
.
These bounds are what motivates the rather small numbers of
rounds of MR testing in the default setting in OpenSSL’s primality
test, for example.
2.1.2 Lucas. The Lucas primality test [5] makes use of Lucas se-
quences, defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Lucas sequence [5]). Let P and Q be integers and
D = P2 − 4Q . Then the Lucas sequences (Uk ) and (Vk ) (with k ≥ 0)
are defined recursively by:
Uk = PUk−1 −QUk−2 where, U0 = 0,U1 = 1,
Vk = PVk−1 −QVk−2 V0 = 2, V1 = P .
Since we are concerned with primality testing cryptographic
sized numbers, we can use efficient techniques for computing large
Lucas sequences such as binary Lucas chains as described in [32].






denotes the Legendre symbol, with value 1 if x is a
square modulo p and value -1 otherwise):
Theorem 2.2 ([13]). Let P and Q be integers, D = P2 − 4Q , and
let the Lucas sequences (Uk ), (Vk ) be defined as above. If p is a prime





) ≡ 0 (mod p). (1)
The Lucas probable prime test repeatedly tests property (1) for
different pairs (P ,Q ). This leads to the notion of a Lucas pseudo-
prime with respect to such a pair.
Definition 2.3 (Lucas pseudoprime). Let P and Q be integers and





) ≡ 0 (mod n), thenn is called a Lucas pseudoprimewith
respect to parameters (P ,Q ).
Similar results to those for the MR primality test can be estab-
lished for the Lucas test: a single Lucas test will declare a given
composite number as being composite with probability at least
1− (4/15) and as being prime with probability at most (4/15), with
these bounds being tight [4].
2.1.3 Baillie-PSW. The Baillie-PSW test [37] is a deterministic
primality test consisting of a single Miller-Rabin test with base 2
followed by a single Lucas test. A slight variant of the test in which
the Lucas test is replaced with a more stringent version, known as
a strong Lucas test is mentioned in [5]. Generally, the consensus
that has emerged over time is that the Lucas test should be used
with the parameters (P ,Q ) set as defined by Selfridge’s method A:
Definition 2.4 (Selfridge’s Method A [5]). LetD be the first element





= −1. Then set
P = 1 and Q = (1 − D)/4.
If no such D can be found, then n must be a square and hence
composite. In practice, one might attempt to find such a D up
to some bound Dmax, then perform a test for squareness using
Newton’s method for square roots (see Appendix C.4 of [24]), before
reverting to a search for a suitable D if needed. This is generally
more efficient than doing a test of squareness first.
The idea of the Baillie-PSW test is that its two components
are in some sense “orthogonal” and should between them catch
all composites. Extensive computations have never produced a
pseudo-prime for the Baillie-PSW test, that is, a composite number
that passes it. Indeed there are (moderate) cash prizes available
for providing one. However, none of these computations extend to
numbers of cryptographic size. Moreover, Pomerance [36] has given
a heuristic argument for the existence of infinitely many Baillie-
PSW pseudo-primes. There do not appear to exist any bounds
demonstrating the test’s strength on uniformly random k-bit inputs,
in contrast to the results of [14] for the MR test. In summary, while
the Baillie-PSW test appears to be very strong, there are no proven
guarantees concerning its accuracy. One positive feature is that,
being deterministic, it does not consume any randomness (whereas
a properly implemented MR test does).
2.1.4 Supplementary and Preliminary Tests. It is often more effi-
cient to perform some supplementary or preliminary testing on an
input n before executing the main work of the primality test. A com-
mon strategy is to first perform trial division on n using a list of r
small primes. This can be done directly, or by equivalently checking
if gcd(
∏r
i pi ,n) , 1 where {p1, . . . ,pr } is the list of primes used.
The list of primes can be partitioned and multiple gcds computed,
so as to match the partial products of primes with the machine
word-size. This is a very cheap test to perform, and can be quite
powerful when testing random inputs. The question arises of how
r , the number of primes to use in trial division, should be set. We
shall return to this question later.
2.1.5 Primality Testing in OpenSSL. Since we will extensively com-
pare our primality test and its API with those of OpenSSL, we give a
detailed description of the approach found in OpenSSL (1.1.1c May
2019). We note that the specific parts of the code studied remain
almost completely unchanged in subsequent versions up to 1.1.1e
(March 2020), and across other long term support (LTS) versions of
OpenSSL such as 1.1.0 and 1.0.2.
OpenSSL provides two functions for primality testing: BN_is-
_prime_ex and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex, both in file bn_prime-
.c. The core part of the code is in the second of these, while the
first simply acts as a wrapper to this function that forces omission
of trial division. The second function call has the form:
int BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(const BIGNUM *w, int
checks, BN_CTX *ctx_passed, int do_trial_division,
BN_GENCB *cb)
Here, w is the number being tested. The option to do trial division
is defined via the do_trial_division flag. When set, the function
will perform trial division using the first 2047 odd primes (exclud-
ing 2), with no gcd optimisations (the code also separately tests
whether the number being tested is equal to 2 or 3, and whether it is
odd). After this, the function calls bn_miller_rabin_is_prime to
invoke the MR testing with pseudo-random bases. The number of
MR rounds is set using the argument checks. When checks is set to
BN_prime_checks, a value that defaults to zero, then the number of
MR rounds is chosen such that the probability of the test declaring
a random composite number n with k bits as being prime is at most
2
−λ
, where λ is the security level that a 2k-bit RSA modulus should
provide. Thus, the number of MR rounds performed is based on
the bit-size k , as per Table 1. The entries here are based on average
case error estimates taken from [29], which in turn references [14].
2.2 Prime Generation
A critical use case for primality testing is prime generation (e.g.
for use in RSA keys). The exact details of the algorithms used vary
across implementations, but the majority follow a simple technique
based on first generating a random initial candidate n of the desired
bit size k , possibly setting some of its bits, then doing trial division
against a list of small primes, before performing multiple rounds
of primality testing using a standard probabilistic primality test
such as the MR test. If the trial division reveals a factor or the MR
test fails, then another candidate is generated. This can be a fresh
random value, but more commonly, implementations add 2 to the
previous candidate n. This allows an important optimisation: if a
k t λ (bits)
k ≥ 3747 3 192
k ≥ 1345 4 128
k ≥ 476 5 80
k ≥ 400 6 80
k ≥ 347 7 80
k ≥ 308 8 80
k ≥ 55 27 64
k ≥ 6 34 64
Table 1: The default number of rounds t of Miller-Rabin per-
formed by OpenSSL 1.1.1c when testing k-bit integers deter-
mined by the function BN_prime_checks_for_size and the
associated bits of security λ.
table of remainders for the trial divisions of n is created in the first
step, then this table of remainders can be quickly updated for the
new candidate n + 2. Fresh divisions can then be avoided – one just
needs to inspect the updated table of remainders. We refer to this
procedure as trial division by sieving or just sieving. It is, of course,
much more efficient than performing trial divisions anew for each
candidate. Note that this approach leads to a slightly non-uniform
distribution on primes: primes that are preceded by a long run
of composites are more likely to result from it than primes that
are close to their preceding primes. However, it is known that the
deviation from the uniform distribution is small [12].
2.2.1 OpenSSL. OpenSSL adopts the above high-level procedure,
with one important difference. The code is found in BN_generate-
_prime_ex in file bn_prime.c. The function call has the following
form:
int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits,
int safe, const BIGNUM *add, const BIGNUM *rem,
BN_GENCB *cb)
Here bits is the desired bit-size, safe is a flag that, when set, asks
the function to produce a safe prime p = 2q + 1, and add and rem
allow the callee to set additional conditions on the returned prime.
We will ignore safe, add and rem in our further work; an analysis
of how they affect prime generation when using our primality test
is left to future work.
The initial steps are performed together in a separate func-
tion called probable_prime. A cryptographically strong pseudo-
random number is first generated by BN_priv_rand. The two most
significant bits and the least significant bit are then set to ensure
the resulting candidate n is odd and of the desired bit-size. This
number is then sieved using a hard-coded list of the first 2047
odd primes p2, . . . ,p2048, so p1 = 2,p2 = 3, . . . ,p2048 = 17863. If
a candidate passes the sieving stage, it is tested for primality by
BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex. This function carries out the default
number of Miller-Rabin rounds, as per Table 1. Trial division is
omitted by setting the do_trial_division flag in the function
call. This is because trial division has already been carried out ex-
ternally via sieving. This exploits the complexity of the OpenSSL
API for primality testing to gain performance, an option not avail-
able if a simplified API is desired (as we do). Importantly, if the MR
tests fail, then instead of going to the next candidate that passes
sieving, a fresh, random starting point is selected and the procedure
begins again from the start.
3 CONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS OF A
PRIMALITY TEST WITH A
MISUSE-RESISTANT API
We now propose how to construct a performant primality test with
a misuse-resistant API. Our design goal is to ensure good perfor-
mance in the most important use cases (malicious input testing,
prime generation) while still maintaining strong security. At the
same time, we want the simplest possible API for developers: a
single input n (the number being tested) and single a 1-bit output
(0 for composite, 1 for probably prime).
We propose four different primality testing functions, all built
from the algorithms described in Section 2.1. The first of these
follows OpenSSL with its default settings, and we name this Miller-
Rabin Average Case (MRAC). It provides a baseline for analysis
and comparison. The second and third use 64 and 128 rounds of
MR testing, respectively. We name them MR64 and MR128. The
fourth uses the Baillie-PSW test, and we name it BPSW for short.
For each of these four options, we provide an assessment (both by
analysis and by simulation) of its security and performance when
considering random composite, random prime, and adversarially
generated composite inputs. We also consider the influence of trial
division on each test’s performance. For concreteness, throughout
we focus on the case of 1024-bit inputs, but of course the results
are easily extended to other bit-sizes.
3.1 Miller-Rabin Average Case (MRAC)
The first test we introduce, MRAC, is a reference implementation
of OpenSSL’s primality test, as per the function BN_is_prime-
_fasttest_ex described in Section 2.1.5 with input checks set
to BN_prime_checks, so that the number of MR rounds performed
is based on the bit-size k , as per Table 1. Recall that this function
either does no trial division or does trial division with the first 2047
odd primes. Of course, this test is quite unsuitable for use in general,
because it performs badly on adversarial inputs: [3] showed that it
has a worst case false positive rate of 1/22t where for example t = 5
for 1024-bit inputs. On the other hand, it is designed to perform
well on random inputs.
3.1.1 MRAC on Random Input. We now consider the expected
number of MR rounds performed when receiving a random 1024
bit odd input. For now, we ignore the effect of trial division. The
probability that a randomly chosen odd k-bit integer is prime is
qk := 2/ ln(2
k ) by standard estimates for the density of primes [42]
(for k = 1024,qk ≈ 1/355). In this case MRAC will do t MR rounds,
as per Table 1. Otherwise, for composite input, up to t rounds of MR
testing will be done. One could use the bounds from [14] to obtain
bounds on the expected number of MR rounds that would be carried
out on composite input. However, for numbers of cryptographic
size (e.g. k = 1024 bits), to a very good approximation, the number
needed is just 1, since with very high probability, a single MR test
is sufficient to identify a composite (recall that the probability that
a single round of MR testing fails to identify a 1024-bit composite
is less than 2
−40
). From this, one can compute the expected number
of rounds needed for a random, odd input: it is approximately the
weighted sum t · qk + 1 · (1 − qk ) = 1 + (t − 1)qk . For k = 1024, we
have t = 5 and qk = 0.0028, and this expression evaluates to 1.026.
3.1.2 MRAC on Random Input with Trial Division. Now we bring
trial division into the picture. Its overall effectiveness will be deter-
mined by the collection of small primes in the list P = {p1,p2, . . . ,pr }
used in the process (where we assume all the pi are odd) and the
relative costs of MR testing and trial division (about 800:1 in our
experiments).
For random odd inputs, the fraction σ (P ) of non-prime candi-
dates that are removed by the trial division by the primes in P can
be computed using the formula:









This follows easily by noting that a fraction 1 − 1pi of integers are
not divisible by pi , so the probability that a randomly sampled







the probability that a randomly sampled odd integer is divisible by
at least one pi is σ (P ). In turn, this means that any candidate that
passes the trial division stage is 1/(1 − σ (P )) times more likely to
be a prime than an odd candidate of equivalent bit-size chosen at
random (this is because a fraction 1 − σ (P ) of integers remain after
sieving, and all primes survive sieving).
But simply adding more primes to the list P is not necessarily
effective: fewer additional composites are removed at a fixed cost
(one additional trial division per prime), and eventually it is better to
move on to a more heavyweight test (such as rounds of MR testing).
Moreover, from inspecting the formula for σ (P ), it is evident that,
for a given size r of set P (and hence a given cost for trial division), it
is better to set P as containing the r smallest odd primes (including 2
is not useful as the inputn is already assumed to be odd). Henceforth,
we assume that when P is of size r , then it consists of the first r odd
primes. We write σr in place of σ (P ) in this case. Using Mertens’
theorem [30], we can approximate σr as follows:
σr ≈ 1 − 2e
−γ / ln(pr ). (3)
where γ = 0.5772 . . . is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
As an example, BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex in OpenSSL per-
forms trial division on the first 2047 odd primes (ending at p2047 =
17863). As shown in Figure 1, using the first r = 2047 primes gives
a value of σ2047 = 0.885. This is only a little larger than using, say,
the r = 128 smallest odd primes yielding σ128 = 0.831.
Now we build a cost model for MRAC including trial division.
This will also be applicable (with small modifications) for our other
tests.
LetCi denote the cost of a trial division for prime pi and letCMR
denote the cost of a single MR test.
4
Then the total cost of MRAC
on random prime k-bit inputs is:
r∑
i=1
Ci + t ·CMR (4)
4
In practice, we could setCi to be a constantCTD for the range of i we are interested
in, but using a more refined approach is not mathematically much more complex.
since the test then always performs all r trial divisions (assuming
k is large enough) and all t MR tests. For random, odd composite
inputs, the average cost is approximately:
σ1 ·C1 + (σ2 − σ1) · (C1 +C2) + . . . + (σr − σr−1) · (C1 + · · · +Cr )
+(1 − σr ) · (
r∑
i=1
Ci +CMR ). (5)
This is because a fraction σ1 of the composites are identified by
the first trial division, a further fraction σ2 − σ1 are identified after
2 trial divisions, etc, while a fraction (1 − σr ) require all r trial
divisions plus (roughly) 1 round of MR. Here we assume that the
MR test performs in the same way on numbers after trial division




(1 − σi−1) ·Ci + (1 − σr ) ·CMR (6)
where we set σ0 = 0. This expression can be simplified further if we
assume that theCi are all equal to someCTD (a good approximation
in practice), and apply Mertens’ theorem again. For details, see the
equivalent analysis in [28].
From expressions (4) and (6), the expected cost for random, odd,
k-bit input can be easily computed via a weighted sumwith weights
qk and 1 − qk . However, the cost is dominated by expression (6)
for the composite case. From (6), the futility of trial division with
many primes is revealed: adding a prime by going from r to r + 1
on average adds a term (1 − σr ) · Cr+1, but only decreases by a
fraction σr+1 − σr the term in front of CMR . As can be seen from
Figure 1, when r is large, 1 − σr is around 0.1, while σr+1 − σr
becomes very small. So each increment in r only serves to increase
the average cost by a fraction of a trial division (and with the cost
of trial division increasing with r ).
Figure 2 shows a sample (theoretical) plot of the average cost of
MRAC as a function of r for k = 1024. This uses as costs CTD =
0.000371ms and CMR = 0.298ms obtained from our experiments
(reported below) for k = 1024 and the weighted sum of expressions
(4), (6). This curve broadly confirms the analysis of [28] which
suggests setting pr = CMR/CTD to minimise the running time of
primality testing with trial division; here we obtain CMR/CTD ≈
800, corresponding to r ≈ 140.5
3.1.3 MRAC on Adversarial Input. Recall from [3] that worst-case
adversarial inputs can fool random-baseMR testing with probability
1/4 per round. The expected number of rounds needed to identify
such inputs as composite is then 1.33. However, with t rounds of
testing, MRAC will fail to identify such composites as being so with
probability 1/22t (and will indicate that the input was prime). Note
that this analysis is unaffected by trial division, since the adversarial
inputs used have no small primes factors – the trial division just
increases the running time of the test.
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The analysis of [28] technically applies to prime generation, but ignores certain terms
in such a way as to actually analyse the cost of primality testing of composite numbers.
In this sense, it is only valid when the cost of primality testing for prime inputs can be
ignored compared to the case of composite inputs; this is not the case in general, but
is a reasonable approximation for MRAC.
Figure 1: Proportion of candidates removed by trial division,
σr , as a function of r , the number of primes used.
Figure 2: A plot of the theoretical running time of MRAC as
a function of r , the number of primes r used in trial division
for k = 1024, using CTD = 0.000371ms and CMR = 0.298ms
obtained from our experiments.
3.2 Miller-Rabin 64 (MR64)
Next we consider trial division followed by up to 64 rounds of
MR testing with random bases (the test will exit early if a base
that is a witness to compositeness of the input n is found). We
refer to this test as MR64. By design, this test guarantees a failure
probability of at most 2
−128
, no matter the input distribution, so
it offers robust security guarantees without the user needing to
understand the context of the test (i.e. whether the test is being
done with adversarial inputs or not).
3.2.1 MR64 on Random Input. As for MRAC, for a random, odd
composite,k-bit input, the expected number of rounds ofMR testing
Figure 3: Comparing the theoretical running time of MR64
and MRAC as a function of r (the number of primes r used
in trial division) for k = 1024, using CTD = 0.000371ms and
CMR = 0.298ms obtained from our experiments.
(without trial division) is very close to 1. On the other hand, for
prime, k-bit input, the number of rounds is exactly 64. This enables
the average cost without trial division on random, odd, k-bit input
to be computed: it is approximately given by the weighted sum
(64 · qk + 1 · (1 − qk )) ·CMR = (1 + 63qk ) ·CMR (7)
For k = 1024, we again have qk = 2/ ln(2
k ) = 0.0028, and this sum
evaluates to 1.18CMR , about 17% higher than MRAC for the same
input distribution.
3.2.2 MR64 on Random Input with Trial Division. Following the
analysis for MRAC, we can compute the cost of MR64 on random,
prime, k-bit input as:
r∑
i=1
Ci + 64 ·CMR (8)
since here all trial divisions are performed, together with 64 rounds
of MR testing. For random, odd, composite input with r -prime trial
division, the expected cost is very close to that of MRAC with the
same r , since whenever MR testing is invoked, almost always one
round suffices. As for the case of MR64 without trial division, it is
the prime inputs that make the cost difference here: they involve 64
rounds of MR testing instead of the (close to) 1 needed for composite
inputs. Again, a theoretical prediction for random, odd input can be
made by combining the expressions for odd, composite and prime
input using a weighted sum.We omit the details, but Figure 3 shows
the theoretical curve for MR64 as compared to MRAC (using costs
CTD = 0.000371ms and CMR = 0.298ms for k = 1024 as before).
3.2.3 MR64 on Adversarial Input. By design, the MR64 test will
fail to identify a worst-case adversarial input as a composite with
probability at most 2
−128
, this after 64 rounds of MR testing. The
expected number of rounds needed to successfully classify such
inputs is again 1.33.
3.3 Miller-Rabin 128 (MR128)
This test is identical to MR64, but up to 128 rounds of MR testing are




. The analysis is almost identical to that for MR64, replacing
64 by 128 where it appears in the relevant formulae. We include it
for comparison purposes and because the OpenSSL documentation
does target 256 bits of security when testing very large numbers
(larger than 6394 bits in size
6
). The headline figure for this test is its
expected cost (without trial division) of (1+ 127qk ) ·CMR , equating
to 1.36 ·CMR on random, odd, 1024-bit inputs, roughly 35% higher
than MRAC at the same input size.
3.4 Baillie-PSW (BPSW)
The final test we consider is the Baillie-PSW test. Recall that this is
the combination of a single Miller-Rabin test to base 2, with a Lucas
test using Selfridge’s Method A to select D. If the input n we are
testing is a perfect square, then there does not exist a valid choice
of D (see Section 2.1.2). So we must decide upon a point to test for
this. Baillie and Wagstaff [5] show that, when n is not square, the
average number of D values that need to be tried until a suitable
one is found is 1.78. We choose to run a test to check if n is a perfect
square only after 7 unsuccessful attempts to select D. This choice
is inspired by other implementations [27] and provides a balance
between the relatively cheap process of testing a choice of D with
the more expensive test for n being a perfect square. We perform
the Miller-Rabin part of the test first, since it is the more efficient
of the two techniques, omitting the Lucas test early if this indicates
compositeness. We then search for D using Selfridge’s Method A,
using it to carry out a Lucas test if found. We abort the search for
D after 7 attempts and then test n for being a perfect square. If this
test fails, we revert to searching for a suitable D and then perform
the Lucas test when one is eventually found.
3.4.1 BPSW on Random Input. The analysis without trial division
is much like that of MRAC, assuming that MR with a fixed base
2 performs as well as MR with a random base when the number
being tested is uniformly random. For prime inputs, the average
cost is CMR +CL , where CL is average the cost of doing the Lucas
part of the test (and any tests of squareness); for composite inputs,
the cost is roughlyCMR since the MR test catches the vast majority
of composites. The performance on random inputs is the weighted
sum of these, as usual. In our implementation, the average forCL for
1024-bit inputs is equal to 17.04·CMR (5.078ms compared to 0.298ms
on average for 1024-bit inputs, based on 2
20
trials). Overall, then,
this test has an expected cost (without trial division) of 1.05 ·CMR
on random, odd, 1024-bit inputs, roughly 4% more than MRAC.
The analysis with trial division is again similar to that for MRAC:
when the input is prime, the average cost is
∑r
i=1Ci +CMR +CL ,
while when the input is composite, it is of the same form as in (6)
(where we are able to omit a term CL under the assumption that
the base 2 MR test is effective in detecting composites). We omit
further detail.
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See the man page https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.0/
man3/BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex.html and code documentation https://github.com/
openssl/openssl/blob/fa4d419c25c07b49789df96b32c4a1a85a984fa1/include/openssl/
bn.h#L159.
3.4.2 BPSW on Adversarial Input. It is relatively easy to construct
composites passing a base 2 MR test. For example, integers of the
form (2x + 1) (4x + 1) with each factor a prime have a roughly 1 in
4 chance of doing so (see [3] for further discussion). Such inputs
are highly likely to be detected by the Lucas part of the BPSW test,
so the cost of BPSW on such inputs would be
∑r
i=1Ci + CMR +
CL . However, we do not know if such numbers are worst-case
adversarial inputs for BPSW, and indeed, we cannot rule out the
existence of BPSW pseudo-primes, that is, composites which are
declared probably prime by the test. Recall that Pomerance [36]
has given heuristic evidence that there are infinitely many such
pseudo-primes. Perhaps the smallest is beyond the bit-size we care
about in cryptographic applications, but we cannot be sure. Note
also that such a pseudo-prime, if it can be found, would always fool
the BPSW test (because the test is deterministic). This is in sharp
contrast to MR64 and MR128, where we can give precise bounds on
the false positive rate of the tests. We consider this, along with the
relative complexity of implementing the BPSW test, to be a major
drawback.
3.5 Experimental Results
Having described our four chosen primality tests and given a theo-
retical evaluation of them, we now turn to experimental analysis.
This analysis gives us a direct comparison with the current ap-
proach of OpenSSL (MRAC with trial division either off or based
on 2047 primes). It also allows us to study how the Baillie-PSW test
performs against Miller-Rabin testing in practice, something that
does not appear to have been explored before.
3.5.1 Random Input. Our results for random, odd, 512-bit, 1024-bit
and 2048-bit inputs to the tests are shown in Table 2. We worked
with 2
25
inputs at each bit size, produced using OpenSSL’s internal
random number generator. All timings are in milliseconds, and
are broken down into results for composite inputs, inputs that
were declared prime, and overall results. We also report results
for different amounts of trial division — none, r ∈ {64, 128, 384}
(which, from our theoretical analysis above, we consider to be a
sensible amount of trial division for the differently-sized inputs) and
r = 2047 (as in OpenSSL). All results were obtained using a single
core of a Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2690 v4 @ 3.20GHz processor,
with code written in C using OpenSSL 1.1.1b (26-Feb-2019) for
big-number arithmetic and basic Miller-Rabin functionality. We
also computed standard deviations to accompany each timing, but
omit the details due to lack of space.
Of the 2
25
random, odd, 1024-bit numbers that we generated,
94947 were prime. This is closely in line with the estimated q1024 ×
2
25 ≈ 94548 given by the usual density estimate.
The results in Table 2 are broadly in-line with our earlier theo-
retical analysis. Some highlights, focussing on 1024-bit inputs:
• MRAC is fast overall, but with r = 2047, OpenSSL is doing
far too much trial division on 1024-bit inputs. Much better
performance could be achieved for this input size in OpenSSL
by setting r = 128 (more than 2x speed-up overall can be
gained).
• MR64 is 8-9 times slower than MRAC on prime input, re-
flecting the many more rounds of MR testing being done in
MR64.
r Declared Composite
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.079
64 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
2047 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067
r Declared Composite
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 0.312 0.313 0.312 0.302
128 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.061
2047 0.135 0.134 0.134 0.133
r Declared Composite
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.39
384 0.401 0.401 0.402 0.401
2047 0.523 0.523 0.523 0.522
r Declared Prime
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 0.375 4.65 9.29 2.11
64 0.389 4.67 9.31 2.12
2047 0.818 5.10 9.73 2.55
r Declared Prime
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 1.50 19.1 38.1 5.39
128 1.55 19.1 38.2 5.44
2047 2.26 19.8 38.9 6.15
r Declared Prime
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 9.55 152.6 305.2 41.6
384 9.87 152.2 304.0 41.9
2047 11.4 153.3 304.8 43.5
r Overall
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 0.086 0.111 0.137 0.091
64 0.022 0.046 0.073 0.031
2047 0.071 0.095 0.121 0.081
(a) 512-bit
r Overall
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 0.315 0.366 0.419 0.316
128 0.067 0.117 0.170 0.077
2047 0.141 0.190 0.244 0.150
(b) 1024-bit
r Overall
MRAC MR64 MR128 BPSW
0 2.41 2.61 2.83 2.45
384 0.414 0.614 0.827 0.459
2047 0.538 0.737 0.948 0.582
(c) 2048-bit
Table 2: The mean running time (in ms) for each test when testing MRAC, MR64, MR128 and BPSW for random (a) 512-bit,
(b) 1024-bit, and (c) 2048-bit odd inputs and various amounts of trial division (r ). We show the breakdown of means for inputs
declared as either prime or composite, as well as the overall averages. Results based on 225 trials.
• MR128 is roughly twice as slow as MR64 on prime input
(reflecting the doubling of rounds of MR testing). On random
input, the gap between MR64 and MR128 is not so large
(because most composites are identified by trial division or
after just one round of MR testing).
• BPSW is quite competitive with MRAC overall and only 2-3
times slower for prime input. This is because the Lucas test
part of BPSW is expensive but rarely invoked for random
input, but always done for prime input.
• Based on overall figures, MR64 with r = 128 outperforms
MRAC with r = 2047 (as used in OpenSSL) by 17% on 1024-
bit input (and by 54% on 512-bit input with r = 64). This
indicates that, by tuning parameters carefully, it is possible
to obtain improved performance over the current approach
used in OpenSSL whilst enjoying strong security across all
use cases (i.e. a guaranteed false positive rate of 2
−128
).
Further improvements in running time can be obtained by fine-
tuning the value of r on a per test basis, and according to input
size. Importantly, the latter is feasible even with a simple API (and
indeed seems to be the only general, input-dependent optimisation
possible). To illustrate this, we show in Figure 4 the average running
times for MRAC and MR64 on random, odd, 1024-bit input for
varying r . The figure also shows the theoretical curves obtained
previously. There is excellent agreement between the experimental
data and the curves obtained from the model. In both cases, the
curve is quite flat around its minimum, but we see that using r = 128
gives close to optimal performance for this value of k = 1024. The
figure also illustrates that using large amounts of trial division (as
per OpenSSL) harms performance for this input size, as was also
explained theoretically in Section 3.1. Specifically, OpenSSL uses
r = 2047, putting its performance with default settings (MRAC)
well above the minimum obtainable with MR64 with a carefully
tuned choice of r .
Figure 4: Experimental and theoretical performance of
MRACandMR64 on random, odd, 1024-bit input for varying
amounts of trial division, r . The horizontal dashed line rep-
resents the minimum of the average running time of MR64
across all choices of r . This gives a visual representation of













Table 3: Number of rounds of MR testing needed to identify
as composite 1024-bit numbers of the formn = (2x+1) (4x+1)
with 2x + 1, 4x + 1 prime from an initial set of 220 candidates.
MRAConly performs 5 rounds ofMR testing for this bit-size
and failed to identify exactly 1000 candidates.
3.5.2 Adversarial Input. To bring into sharp relief the failings of
MRAC as a general-purpose primality test, we generated a set of
2
20
1024-bit composites of the form n = (2x + 1) (4x + 1) in which
the factors 2x + 1, 4x + 1 are both prime. Numbers of this special
form are known to pass random-base MR tests with probability 1/4.
We then put these n through our MRAC and MR64 tests without
trial division,
7
tracking how many rounds of MR were used on
each input by each test. Table 3 shows the results. MR64 needed
a maximum of 10 rounds of MR testing to correctly classify all
the inputs, while MRAC, using only 5 rounds of MR for inputs
of this size, incorrectly classified exactly 1000 of the inputs. This
performance is in-line with expectations, as the expected number
of misclassifications is 2
20 × (1/4)5 = 210.
3.6 Other Bit Sizes
So far in our experimental evaluation, we have focussed onk = 1024,
i.e. testing of 1024-bit inputs. We have carried out similar testing
also for k = 512, 2048, 3072. Figures 5, 6 and 7 show these additional
results for the MRAC and MR64 tests, focussing on the effect of
varying r on running time. Notice the characteristic “hockey-stick”
shape of the curves in all the figures.
In each figure, the dashed horizontal time highlights the mini-
mum running time for MR64. Notably, for k = 512, this is signifi-
cantly lower than MRAC with r = 2047 (as in OpenSSL). We saw
the same effect for k = 1024 in Figure 4. For k = 2048, MR64 with
the best choice of r is slightly slower than MRACwith r = 2047 (but
still competitive). For k = 3072, the influence of r on running time
is quite small, and MRAC consistently comes out ahead of MR64
(but recall that MRAC is unsafe for maliciously chosen inputs).
These experiments confirm our earlier observation: the choice
of r , the amount of trial division, can have a significant effect on
running time of primality tests, and should be taken into account
when selecting a test.
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Including trial division would not change the results.
Figure 5: Experimental and theoretical performance of
MRAC and MR64 on random, odd, 512-bit input for varying
amounts of trial division, r .
Figure 6: Experimental and theoretical performance of
MRAC and MR64 on random, odd, 2048-bit input for vary-
ing amounts of trial division, r .
3.7 Selecting a Primality Test
We select MR64 with the amount of trial division, r , depending on
the input size as our preferred primality test. Our reasons are as
follows:
• MR64 has strong security guarantees across all use cases (un-
like MRAC and BPSW). These guarantees can be improved
by switching to MR128, but we consider the guarantees of
MR64 to be sufficient for perhaps all but the most stringent
requirements.
• MR64 is easy to implement, while a test like BPSW requires
significant additional code (see Appendix B).
Figure 7: Experimental and theoretical performance of
MRAC and MR64 on random, odd, 3072-bit input for vary-
ing amounts of trial division, r .
• MR64 with an input-size-dependent choice of r outperforms
the current approach used in OpenSSL (MRAC with fixed
r = 2047) up to k = 1024 and remains competitive with
MRAC even for larger inputs. (Obviously OpenSSL could
also be made faster by tuning r , but this would not improve
security for malicious inputs).
• MR64 permits a very simple API, with a single input (the
number being tested) and a single output (whether the input
was composite or probably prime), whilst still allowing input-
size-dependent tuning of r .
Table 4 shows our recommended values of r to use with MR64,
based on the experimental results obtained above. Further small
improvements in performance could be obtained by being more
precise in setting r values and by further partitioning the set of k
values, but the gains would be marginal.
We further validate this selection of MR64 in the next section,
where we examine the performance of different tests when used as
part of prime generation (as opposed to testing).
4 PRIME GENERATION
In this section, we want to assess the impact of our choice of pri-
mality test on a key use case, prime generation. We focus on the
scenario where our primality test is used as a drop-in replacement
for the existing primality test in OpenSSL, without making any
modifications to the prime generation code. We are not suggesting
this should be done in practice, but merely evaluating the impact
of switching to our proposed test in a strawman application.
4.1 Experimental Approach
In order to establish a benchmark, we first use OpenSSL’s prime
number generating function BN_generate_prime_ex as it appears
in the standard library. As discussed in detail in Section 2.2, this
k r
k ∈ [1, 512] 64
k ∈ [513, 1024] 128
k ∈ [1025, 2048] 384
k ∈ [2049, 3072] 768
k ∈ [3073,∞) 1024
Table 4: Recommended values of r for use with the MR64
primality test.
k r used MR64 MRAC Overhead
512 64 12.37 8.859 40%
1024 128 60.83 45.20 35%
2048 384 385.2 268.5 43%
3072 768 1379 946.7 46%
Table 5: Running time (in ms) for prime generation us-
ing our proposed primality test (MR64 with input-length-
dependent trial division) and current OpenSSL primality
test (MRAC with no trial division). Each timing is based on
2
20 trials.
involves sieving with s = 2047 primes and using the OpenSSL
primality test that consumes t rounds of MR testing on a sequence
of candidates n, n + 2, . . ., restarting the procedure from scratch
whenever an MR test fails. Here t is determined as in Table 1 (i.e. the
test is what we call MRAC). Importantly, OpenSSL exploits the rich
API of its primality test to switch off trial division in the primality
tests, since that trial division is already taken care of by the cheaper
sieving step.
Next, we change the underlying primality test to use our selected
test: MR64 with input-length-dependent trial division (as per Ta-
ble 4), keeping all other aspects of OpenSSL’s prime generation
procedure the same. All the trial division done in our underlying
primality test is of course redundant, because of the sieving step
carried out in OpenSSL’s prime generation code. However, with our
deliberately simplified API for primality testing, that extra work
would be unavoidable. Similarly, our underlying primality test per-
forms more rounds of MR testing (64 instead of the 3-5 used in
MRAC) when a prime is finally encountered. It is the amount of
this extra work that we seek to quantify here.
Our experimental results are shown in Table 5. It can be seen
that the overhead of switching to our primality test in this use
case ranges between 35% and 46%. This is a significant cost for this
use case, but recall that the gain is a primality test that has strong
security guarantees across all use cases, along with a simple and
developer-friendly API.
We can build simple cost models which illustrate the perfor-
mance differences we have observed; see also [28] for a similar
model. Details are deferred to Appendix A
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND INTEGRATION IN
OPENSSL
We communicated our findings to the OpenSSL development team,
specifically to Kurt Roeckx, one of the OpenSSL core developers.
He did his own performance testing, and concluded that our new
API and primality test should be deployed in OpenSSL. In personal
communication with Roeckx, we were informed that these changes
are slated for inclusion in OpenSSL 3.0, which is scheduled for re-
lease in Q4 of 2020.
In more detail, the following changes were made:
• Our proposed API is included via a new, external facing func-
tion (see https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c#L253):
int BN_check_prime(const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx,
BN_GENCB *cb)
{
return bn_check_prime_int(p, 0, ctx, 1, cb);
}
This code wraps the existing “internal" primality testing
function
bn_check_prime_int. Note that the API has 3 parameters,
instead of our desired 1: OpenSSL still needs to pass pointers
to context and callback objects for programmatic reasons.
• The “internal” primality testing function bn_check_prime-
_int has been updated to do a minimum of 64 rounds of MR
testing (and 128 rounds for 2048+ bit inputs). This deviates
slightly from our recommendation to always do 64 rounds
of testing – it is more conservative. Note that the average
case analysis of [14] is no longer used to set the number
of rounds of MR testing in the default case. This function
also uses a small table to determine how many primes to
use in trial division; the numbers are aligned with our rec-
ommendations in Table 4. Details are in the new function
calc_trial_divisions.8
• The rest of the OpenSSL codebase has been updated to
use the new API, except for the prime generation code.
That code has also been updated (see https://github.com/
openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c#L123). It
now uses yet a third internal function for its primality testing
(see bn_prime.c#L170):
bn_is_prime_int(ret, checks, ctx, 0, cb);
Here, checks determines the number of rounds ofMR testing
done, and is set to either 64 or 128 according to the input
size. In the call, "0" indicates that trial division is no longer
done. The number of MR rounds here could have been set
based on average case performance, as was formerly the case,
rather than worst case, but it seems the OpenSSL developers
have opted for simplicity over performance. Not doing trial
division inside the primality test is appropriate here because
the inputs have already been sieved to remove numbers with
small prime factors by this point.
• The “old" and complex external-facing APIs in the functions
BN_is_prime_ex and BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex have been
8
See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/bn/bn_prime.c#L74.
marked for deprecation in OpenSSL 3.0: they will only be
included in a build of the library in case the environmental
variable OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 is set.9
5.1 Reference Implementation of Baillie-PSW
For completeness, in Appendix B, we give a reference implementa-
tion of the Baillie-PSW test as it could be implemented in OpenSSL.
This also helps to provide an understanding of the increase in code
complexity involved in using this test.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We have proposed a primality test that is both performant and
misuse-resistant, in the sense of presenting a simplest-possible
interface for developers. The test balances code simplicity, perfor-
mance, and security guarantees across all use cases. We have not
seen a detailed treatment of this fundamental problem in the litera-
ture before, despite the by-now classical nature of primality testing
as a cryptographic task. Our recommendations – both for the API
and for the underlying primality test – have been adopted in full
by OpenSSL and are scheduled for inclusion in OpenSSL 3.0, which
is expected to be released in Q4 2020.
10
We have focussed in this work on regular prime generation.
Our work could be extended to consider efficiency of safe-prime
generation. Special sieving procedures can be used in this case: if
one creates a table of values n mod pi , then one can also test 2n + 1
for divisibility by each of the pi very cheaply; techniques like this
were used in [18] in a slightly different context. Further work is
also needed to fully assess the impact of the amount of sieving (s)
on the performance of prime generation at different input lengths
(k). Our work could also be extended to make a systematic study
of prime generation code in different cryptographic libraries. For
example, we have already noted that the OpenSSL code aborts and
restarts whenever a Miller-Rabin test fails; this behaviour leads to
sub-optimal performance, and it would be interesting to see how
much the code in OpenSSL and in other leading libraries could be
improved.
One can view our work as addressing a specific instance of the
problem of how to design simple, performant, misuse-resistant APIs
for cryptography. In our discussion of related work, we highlighted
other work where this problem has also been considered, in sym-
metric encryption, key exchange, and secure channels. A broader
research effort in this direction seems likely to yield significant
rewards for the security of cryptographic software. As here, it may
occasionally also yield improved performance.
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A COST MODEL FOR PRIME GENERATION
Sieving can be recast as a one-time trial division of the first candi-
date n with the first s odd primes (OpenSSL uses s = 2047), followed
by per candidate updating of a table of remainders. We assume the
latter can be done essentially for free compared to other operations
and ignore its cost henceforth. Then the average cost of prime gen-
eration when the underlying primality test uses up to t rounds of









ln(2k ) · (1 − σs )/2
)
·CMR + (t − 1) ·CMR . (9)
Here the first term comes from sieving. The second term comes
from, on average, inspecting ln(2k ) · (1 − σs )/2 odd, composite
candidates in the sieved version of the list n,n + 2,n + 4, . . . before
encountering a prime, and doing 1 MR test to reject each composite
(recall that, because of sieving, the density of primes in the list
n,n + 2,n + 4, . . . is boosted by a factor 1/(1 − σs ); recall also that
almost every random composite is rejected with just 1 MR test).
The third term comes from doing a further t − 1MR tests when a
prime is finally found. To model OpenSSL’s performance, we would
set t according to Table 1.
It should be evident from expression (9) that, as with trial division,
working with large s in the initial sieve is not profitable: eventually,
the gains made from decreasing the term 1 − σs are outweighed
by the cost of initial sieving by trial division. Moreover, this model
neglects the true cost of updating the table of remainders between
candidates. This cost is linear in s (albeit with a small constant) and
so heightens the effect. A more detailed model including this cost
could of course be developed.
If we now assume that (redundant) trial division with r ≤ s
primes is also carried out in the underlying primality test, and that















Ci ) +CMR ) + (t
′ − 1) ·CMR
(10)
Here, the additional cost compared to (9) is precisely that of doing
a full set of r trial divisions for each candidate – this cost is always
incurred because when r ≤ s , all the candidates which might fail
trial division at some early stage have already failed on sieving. To
model the performance of OpenSSL with our chosen primality test,
MR64, t ′ must be set to 64 rather than the values in Table 1; the
difference means that, when a prime is finally encountered, the cost
of testing it will be higher.
The difference in the costs as expressed in (9) and (10) is given
by: (





Ci ) + δt ·CMR (11)
where δt = t
′−t , depending on k , is the difference in the maximum
number of rounds of MR testing carried out in the two cases.
For MR64 and MRAC, and for k of cryptographic size, δt ranges
between 59 and 61. For our selected primality test, MR64 with input-
length-dependent trial division, r in the above expression is also
k-dependent, and is set by Table 4. The first term in (11) accounts
for the cost of redundant trial division over the first r primes for
N := ln(2k ) · (1 − σs )/2 different candidates. Here both r and N
are in the range of a few hundred. For example, when k = 1024
we set r = 128, and when s = 2047, we have N ≈ 41. Hence, when
k = 1024, we do about 5200 redundant trial divisions, compared
to an extra δt = 59 MR tests. For this k , the extra MR tests are
about 8 times more expensive than the redundant trial divisions
(roughly 17.5ms versus 2ms based on our experimental timings).
This indicates that the redundant trial division contributes much
less to the overhead of prime generation than do the extra MR tests
that are necessary to make our primality test secure in all use cases.
Note that this analysis ignores the fact that OpenSSL aborts
and restarts with a fresh, random value whenever an MR test fails;
this effect may be significant in practice and we leave a detailed
evaluation to future work. Note also that this modelling deficiency
does not affect our experimental results reported in the main body,
since they were obtained by measuring the running time of the
actual OpenSSL code.
B REFERENCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
BAILLIE-PSW TEST
For completeness, we include here our code that implements a
Baillie-PSW primality test in the context of OpenSSL’s bn_prime.c.
Functions from the existing OpenSSL code-base have been omitted.
bn_prime_bpsw.c
int BN_is_prime_BPSW_ex(BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx_passed ,
int do_trial_division , BN_GENCB *cb)
{
int i, j, l, ret = -1;
int k;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *A1, *A1_odd , *check = BN_new (); /* taken from ctx */
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
TRIAL_DIVISION_PRIMES = 129;
BN_set_word(check , 2); //only testing MR to base 2
/* Take care of the really small primes 2 & 3 */
if (BN_is_word(a, 2) || BN_is_word(a, 3))
return 1;
/* Check odd and bigger than 1 */
if (! BN_is_odd(a) || BN_cmp(a, BN_value_one ()) <= 0)
return 0;
/* first look for small factors */
if (do_trial_division) {
for (i = 1; i < TRIAL_DIVISION_PRIMES; i++) {
BN_ULONG mod = BN_mod_word(a, primes[i]);
if (mod == (BN_ULONG )-1)
goto err;
if (mod == 0)
return BN_is_word(a, primes[i]);
}
if (! BN_GENCB_call(cb, 1, -1))
goto err;
}
if (ctx_passed != NULL)
ctx = ctx_passed;





if (check == NULL)
goto err;
/* compute A1 := a - 1 */
if (! BN_copy(A1, a) || !BN_sub_word(A1 , 1))
goto err;
/* write A1 as A1_odd * 2^k */
k = 1;
while (! BN_is_bit_set(A1, k))
k++;
if (! BN_rshift(A1_odd , A1, k))
goto err;
/* Montgomery setup for computations mod a */
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new ();
if (mont == NULL)
goto err;
if (! BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont , a, ctx))
goto err;
j = witness(check , a, A1, A1_odd , k, ctx , mont);















if (ctx != NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);






int BN_lucas_test_ex(BIGNUM * n){
// performs a Lucas test (with Selfridge 's paramters) on n
BIGNUM *two = BN_new ();
BN_set_word(two , 2);
// sanity check input , n odd and > 2












BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
BIGNUM *result = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *zero= BN_new ();
BIGNUM *np1 = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *minusone = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *u = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *d = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *minusnineteen = BN_new ();
int32_t J;
int32_t res;
const char *m1 = "-1";
const char *m19 = "-19";
BN_add(np1 ,n,BN_value_one ());
BN_zero(zero);
BN_dec2bn (&minusone , m1);
BN_dec2bn (& minusnineteen , m19);
BN_set_word(d, 5);
// while jacobi(d,n) != -1
while ((J = BN_jacobi(d,n))!= -1) {


















u = BN_lucas_sequence(d,np1 ,n);
BN_mod(result ,u,n,ctx);



















int BN_jacobi(BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *n){
// computes jacobi symbol of (a/n),
// currently returns 2 if a,n are invalid input
BIGNUM *x = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *y = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *halfy = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *r = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *s = BN_new ();
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
BN_nnmod(x,a,n,ctx);
BN_copy(y,n);
int J = 1;
int k = 0;
BIGNUM *three = BN_new ();
BN_set_word(three , 3);
BIGNUM *four = BN_new ();
BN_set_word(four , 4);
BIGNUM *five = BN_new ();
BN_set_word(five , 5);
BIGNUM *eight = BN_new ();
BN_set_word(eight , 8);




while (BN_cmp(y,BN_value_one ()) == 1) { // while y > 1
BN_mod(x,x,y,ctx);
BN_rshift1(halfy ,y);
if (BN_cmp(x,halfy )==1) {
BN_sub(x,y,x);
BN_mod(r,y,four ,ctx);









//count the zero bits in x,
//i.e the largest value of n s.t 2^n divides x evenly.
k = 0;






























void BN_rshift1_round(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a){
// temporary fix as part of code demo , but the rounding in BN_rshift1
// is not consistant with python/java across positive and negative numbers.
// This function adds one before the shift if a is negative and performs
// BN_rshift1 normally otherwise. e.g this function rounds -127/2 = -63.5
// to -64 (toward -infinity), where as BN_rshift1 would round to -63 (toward 0)
// This is needed in my implementation of jacobi symbol calculation.
//Can 't simply negate result , as we still want 127/2 = 63.
BIGNUM *zero= BN_new ();
BIGNUM *one= BN_new ();
BN_zero(zero);
BN_one(one);










BIGNUM * BN_lucas_sequence(BIGNUM *d, BIGNUM *k, BIGNUM *n){
// computes the Lucas sequence U_k modulo n, where d = p^2 -4q
BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
BIGNUM *kp1 = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *u = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *v = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *u2 = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *v2 = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *r= BN_new ();
BIGNUM *zero= BN_new ();






size_t k_bits = BN_num_bits(kp1) -1;
for (size_t i = k_bits -1; i != (size_t) -1; --i) {
BN_mod_mul(u2,u,v,n,ctx);
BN_mod_sqr(r,u,n,ctx); //r = u^2 mod n
BN_mod_mul(r,r,d,n,ctx); // r = r *d = u^2 *d (mod n)
BN_mod_sqr(v2,v,n,ctx); //v2 = v^2 mod n
BN_mod_add(v2,v2,r,n,ctx); // v2 = v2 + r = v^2 + (u^2*d) (mod n)
if (BN_is_odd(v2)) {






BN_nnmod(r,v,n,ctx); //r= v mod





BN_mod_mul(r,d,u,n,ctx); // r = d*u mod n



















BIGNUM * BN_is_perfect_square(BIGNUM * C){
//https :// nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS .186 -4. pdf sec C.4
// checks if C is a perfect square.
//If so, function returns X where C = X^2 else function returns 0
BIGNUM *one= BN_new ();
BIGNUM *zero= BN_new ();
BIGNUM *ret= BN_new ();
BN_one(one);
BN_zero(zero);
if (BN_cmp(one ,C)==1) {








BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new ();
BIGNUM *B = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *X = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *r = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *s = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *X2 = BN_new ();
BIGNUM *two= BN_new ();
size_t c_bits = BN_num_bits(C);
size_t m = (c_bits +1)/2;
BN_set_word(two , 2);
BN_set_bit(B,m);
BN_add(B,B,C);
BN_set_bit(X,m);
BN_sub(X,X,one);
BN_mul(X2,X,X,ctx);
for (;;) {
BN_add(r,X2,C);
BN_mul(s,X,two ,ctx);
BN_div(X,NULL ,r,s,ctx);
BN_mul(X2,X,X,ctx);
if (BN_cmp(B,X2)==1) {
break;
}
}
if (BN_cmp(X2,C)==0) {
ret = X;
goto free;
}
else {
ret = zero;
goto free;
}
free:
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_free(B);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
BN_free(X2);
BN_free(one);
BN_free(two);
BN_free(zero);
return ret;
}
